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Abstract
This paper looks at the possibility of creating an algorithm that will
combine liveness and coercion modalities, along with organisational factors
such as workforce composition. This algorithm will produce a security value,
which can then be compared with other combinations of modalities, there-
fore, providing a way to test potential security setups without having to
tangibly implement them. An experimental methodology has been used, fo-
cusing on the development of the algorithm, and the associated effects of it.
The hypothesis is that the algorithm can produce a value that can further
be used to compare different setups of biometric security. This comparative
value can be used to discover the best combinations of modalities for fusion
development or practical installation. After testing, the algorithm is proved
to work as it creates an appropriate value, called the security value, which
can then be compared with other setups to find the most suitable for a given
situation. There are some issues with this primarily due to data provision,
the requirements for more data to parse through the algorithm, and finally,
the need for a suitable interface, otherwise it may be too complex for efficient
usage in a traditional security environment. This algorithm provides a spe-
cific security value that can be applied to a variety of situations, for example,
there are potential implications within a general security application; such
as liveness and coercion multimodal fusion, autonomous system development
and pervasive environments; such as allowing dynamic security systems to
be developed. However the main focus of this algorithm is to highlight the
fusion of liveness and coercion detection, and how they can be best applied
to specific security scenarios.
Keywords: Biometric Security, Liveness, Coercion, Autonomic Computing,
Self-optimisation, Fusion, Personalised Security.
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1. Introduction
When considering biometric security, the most appropriate device and
liveness detection techniques are of the utmost importance. These can often
be heavily influenced by a variety of developer preferences such as ease of
implementation; cost constraints; device suitability, subsequently leading to
the potential integration of less than optimal techniques and components for
a particular system, or for the system’s workforce. This process is becom-
ing increasingly complex as more security techniques are developed making
successful fusion even harder to achieve effectively. When combining mul-
tiple technologies, sample acquisition and liveness, it is imperative that the
method of combination is efficient and effective. This is also very important
when working towards the future-proofing of new techniques of sample gath-
ering, liveness detection but also new security approaches. This fusion of
techniques and devices needs to be considered throughout the development
process. At what point in the architectural journey will fusion be the most
efficient and effective, either for each area individually, or the system as a
whole? Research into device and liveness fusion is extensive as highlighted
by [1] and [2], and has become a standard aspect of biometric security de-
tection and monitoring. Whilst presentation attacks are the most utilised
threat vector, with liveness being designed to combat this threat, there are
other threat vectors being found all the time. In this paper, one such vector
is proposed which starts at the presentation layer, and coercion detection;
this checks to see if a user is begin coerced into authenticating. When try-
ing to detect and deal with this, additional complexity will be added to the
system, as well as more demands placed on the important metrics such as
performance and time.
This paper presents a technique to incorporate coercion detection stan-
dards into current or future, biometric security system. To do this, a theoreti-
cal framework for measuring the most efficient liveness and coercion detection
techniques in a given scenario will be discussed, placing a higher emphasis on
efficiency and speed of completion. While the current research on coercion
detection is quite limited, [3][4][5], however, this has been partially explored
by [6]. This paper will focus on real-time liveness and coercion techniques
that have been chosen due to their accuracy and universality. Furthermore,
this framework will help identify the best methods of technique integration
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from a device and technique level. This is a novel approach as currently the
inclusion of coercion techniques are not considered the norm for biometric
security, and there are no current projects focusing on this area as far as the
authors can find. However, there are numerous scenarios when the coercion
is being perpetrated by law enforcement, and there is currently an extensive
debate on the validity of this in numerous countries for example [7]. How-
ever, this is not the area this paper is focusing on. This paper focuses on an
individual being coerced by a nefarious attacker, instead of a law enforcement
representative.
Traditionally, data simulations of different techniques would be consid-
ered, or practical testing would take place. In this scenario, a small scale
dataset is being used that corresponds to a higher education institution.
This data is easily accessed via opensource repositories and allows for effec-
tive comparison of different devices and security factors such as biometric
device and liveness/coercion standards. This would subsequently allow secu-
rity developers to identify viable combinations for system implementations,
as well as test combinations that might be otherwise difficult to model due
to a particular workforce, or location noise deviation factors, for example,
high levels of specific disabilities, or areas of extreme thermal divergence.
There are two main goals within this paper: firstly to measure the reli-
ability of a specific system configuration, making use of biometric devices,
liveness and coercion standards; secondly allowing the optimisation of the
said system, either manually or autonomically to better suit the scenario.
To achieve this, the paper will discuss the creation of a security vari-
able, which can be used to compare to other permutations within the model
and find the most effective technique for a specific scenario, effectively ad-
dressing the first aim. This is done by developing an algorithm that will
take into consideration all of the associated factors within a system and pro-
duce an output that can be used by the system developer. However, it will
not consider the development of additional coercion techniques, instead, the
ones highlighted in [6], such as tangible key techniques and facial micromove-
ments,will be used. Data will be simulated through the model and will output
an appropriate ”score” which can then be compared to different technique
combinations. This value can then be used to optimise said systems either
manually or autonomically. Section 1 will introduce the paper; Section 2 will
discuss coercion and liveness detection, and the impact on secure systems;
Section 3 will detail the justification of development styles; Section 4 will
discuss the testing factors used and consider the overall performance of the
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algorithm and finally; Section 5 will conclude the paper.
2. Coercion and Liveness Detection
Due to the ease in which some biometric techniques can be spoofed, the
application of liveness standards within a device is no longer an afterthought,
instead it is an integral requirement. This can be seen over many research
projects spanning the last fifteen plus years such as [8] to [9]. The current
application of liveness differs dramatically depending on the intra-fusion re-
quirements and can be seen in current literature such as [10] [11] [12]. It is
an excepted factor of biometric security that liveness needs to be included
if security is the main requirement of the installation, otherwise, there runs
the risk of compromising the system. Areas where this is not applied is the
application of biometric techniques within smart devices, which rarely have
robust liveness standards [13]. However, this concept is being challenged es-
pecially with events such as MoBio LivDet [14]. Whilst the focus has been
firmly on liveness detection, this does not mean other threats should be ig-
nored. In previous papers [6] coercion detection has been highlighted as a
potential area of interest. This concept has been discussed briefly across a
number of other areas such as: highlighting the impact it could have [15]; the
impacts of coercion on responsibility shifting attacks [5]; using calming mu-
sic to reduce neurophysiological responses during coercion [16]; despite this,
there are biometric implications of coercion which have not been researched
thoroughly. As with liveness detection, it will take some time to thoroughly
integrate into the overall biometric process, however, the importance of this
integration is plain to see across the biometric research spectrum [17].
The use of coercion within biometrics is not new, in fact, it has been
discussed in a number of areas, however, this is normally only regarding the
forced provision of personal samples - such as taking fingerprints by force
and so on [18] [19] [20]. When considering coercion the following definition
is used The action or practise of persuading someone to do something by
using force or threats. [21]. However, there is very little information dealing
with individuals forcing users to authenticate into a system, subsequently
letting the attacker access restricted physical or digital areas. The few re-
searchers looking into this area focus on countermeasures such as [16] and
[5], highlighting that this is a potential threat area. This paper focuses on
the integration of coercion techniques within a secure system, therefore pro-
viding the installation with techniques of detection and prevention, as well
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as how to check for suitability and effectiveness within a system by using the
developed algorithm.
Figure 1: Coercion Attack Model.
2.1. Liveness Detection
Liveness detection modalities are included to address the innate flaws
with biometric sample collection provision, specifically, the impact of latent
sample collection, therefore reducing the impact of sample spoofing, which
became a growing problem in the 2000s as highlighted by [22] and [23]. At
first, these techniques were completely independent of the sample used and
required additional progression steps. Now many different liveness detection
techniques make use of current technologies, such as galvanic skin response
GSR (now know as skin conductivity response SCR), respiration, and heart
rate [24] and [25]. Therefore, the following section will endeavour to address
the algorithmic development process that allows the framework to function.
This will then be tested using data gathered from a standard organisation
structure, as well as some government based statistics.
Numerous liveness techniques are used for different biometric modalities,
and more are being developed all the time as can be seen in the annual
LivDet challenge [26]. While there is a wide range of liveness modalities that
can be accessed for different biometric samples, in this work, we will focus on
fingerprint and facial recognition samples. This is due to their ubiquity with
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security environments [17], acceptance of use [27], and applicability through
coercion modalities [28].
When considering facial recognition, numerous techniques can be ac-
cessed, and although most Liveness techniques are based on texture factor-
sother factors can be considered such as life sign measures and deep feature
analysis. When considering texture analysis, this is normally achieved with
either traditional Local Binary Patterns (LBP), or by using advanced LBP.
Using LBP involves gathering several parameters by splitting the sample im-
age into several local regions. Here the LBP descriptors are extracted from
each region independently, which are then combined to create one overall
face description. When considering the application within liveness detection,
the same process is followed however instead of a full face image, the texture
within the different regions is considered, as 3d textures are required. This is
something that a printed image should not be able to replicate unless using
three-dimensional techniques such as 3d printers. Histograms of each region
are then gathered and concatenated together, providing an overall sample
view. These histograms allow a comparison to be conducted, and this com-
parison is achieved by using techniques such as euclidean distance, chi-square
and absolute values. This process is highlighted within in Figure 2 [29]. Al-
though this is a common technique, there are some very problematic factors.
The main one is that the quality of the image is paramount, and there can
be a massive drop in performance when the image is of low quality. The
drop in performance is because the lower the quality of image, the harder
it is to collect valid region data that translates into usable histogram data
subsequently minimising the impact of the measure algorithm [30].
Figure 2: Coercion Attack Techniques. [29]
Alternative techniques include the use of life sign factors such as blood
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flow, voluntary/involuntary signals and facial micromovement. These are the
techniques that have the most in common with coercion detection, as they
can be affected by a multitude of emotional responses [31]. Microexpressions
are very effective as they not intentionally created, and there do not produce
false information that can be caused with specific manipulation techniques
such as planning and timing. The process of gathering the liveness data is
the same as a standard microexpression, and the most common processes
make use of Active Shape Model (ASM) [32] [33], Discriminative Response
Maps Fitting (DRMF) [34], Subspace Constrained Mean-Shifts (SCMS) [35],
Face++ automatic facial point detector [36], and Constraint Local Model
(CLM)[37].
Fingerprint modalities likewise have numerous techniques which are split
between software and hardware. Hardware techniques make use of additional
information such as blood flow [38], odor [39], and salinity [40]. The primary
issues with these techniques are the requirement of additional hardware for
them to function. This can be costly, and can add another layer of inter-
action in front of the user, a negative factor if attempting to accomplish a
transparent process.
The alternative approach is to make use of software techniques that are
focusing on data that is provided during the sample collection process and
does not require any additional hardware to gather information. Techniques
are usually highlighted as belonging to one of twoclasses, feature-based, and
deep learning. The use of techniques such as LBP to gather texture details is
a standard modality, however other techniques involve the inclusion of deep
machine learning [41], and convolutional networks to detect liveness [42].
2.2. Coercion Detection
Traditional biometric architecture is well documented and has been dis-
cussed in many sources such as [17]. When considering how this is applied in
coercion detection, Figure: 1 shows the workflow. Firstly the attacker finds
an appropriate user then forces them, through some manner of physical or
mental threatening behaviour, to authenticate into the system. When this
happens, the user authenticates as they are legitimately allowed into the sys-
tem. The attacker then takes control of the device/place and continues their
nefarious activities. From a system standpoint, there is no security breach as
the user has access rights to the system. Currently, there is no way to check
for this coercion in standard biometric devices; however, in a previous paper,
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[6] some techniques for coercion detection are proposed. Some of these tech-
niques can be seen in Figure: 3 some of which are already used within other
areas of biometric security, e.g. such as skin conductance response (SCR)
tests, used within liveness detection modalities [43] while some are original
techniques for coercion such as intentional false authentication [6]. Figure 3
highlights some coercion techniques, theses are not being discussed in detail
in this work, for further information see [6].
Figure 3: Coercion Attack Example Techniques.
As Figure 3 shows there are three types of coercion modalities which are
involuntary, voluntary and environmental. Involuntary modalities are pri-
marily focused on physiological signals, which have the potential to be useful
as they require the least conscious effort from the user and therefore are not
susceptible to users getting things incorrect. There are many potential vari-
ances when gathering involuntary modalities such as facial micromovements
[44], as well as other medical modalities such as heart rate [45], perspiration
8
[46], and so on. This is due to the transient nature of medical factors and
the plethora of factors that can change the samples. [4][47], all of which
can occur outside of a coercion scenario. The second concept would be a
voluntary approach which requires the user to provide some additional infor-
mation. This is usually done with non-medical data, for example, speaking
a password or selecting a pattern. There are a variety of forms this could
take. For example, the user may carry a key which may be used as a ’panic
alarm’. This is standard practice in areas such as health and elderly care;
therefore, the concept is already disseminated throughout society [48]. A
second approach would be to utilise a selection of passcodes/keys that would
denote coercion. Although to be thoroughly effective, the technique would
have to be completely integrated within the full biometric system; otherwise,
the use of the traditional key system would be seen as a simple and more
straightforward approach to security. Without the thorough integration, it
would also become evident to the attacker that some preventative measure
is being taken, as the inclusion of a key in the final stage would become
suspicious for a nefarious user, and therefore reduce the effectiveness of the
technique. The final modality is via environmental data. Instead of utilising
data provided by the user, either voluntarily or involuntary, data gathered
from the surrounding area is used. Unfortunately, this technique can be
problematic to implement as it correlates data with the user being used as a
focal point and will have to search for multiple samples which can make some
sample collection modalities become less effective [13]. For example, the use
of cameras and proximity maps can depict if there are people close together.
While on its own, this is both irrelevant, and can easily be explained away
with a handful of reasons; user’s are huddling from weather, close relation-
ships and so on. However, when combined with additive security protocols,
the development can become more impressive. For example, all users must
make sure they are on their own when authenticating into a system, no more
than one user with a biometric scanner at any one time etc. Therefore, if
a proximity sensor can detect multiple people closer together, then it can
indicate an attack of some kind [49]. There is a host of potential problems
with this form of approach, least of all the ease of misunderstanding. Using
the above example, if two users were carrying a heavy parcel, they would
be identified as too close, and therefore the system would respond, in this
case, erroneously. There are also other noise-based concerns, such as using
thermal sensors/imaging and being able to differentiate between humans and
other species such as cats and dogs.
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3. Algorithm Development
The algorithm has been developed using a hybrid style: brute force along-
side a divide and conquer technique. Initially, a brute force base is being used
as it is more easily combined with other techniques. This will improve effi-
ciency as the implementation of this algorithm will use a variety of different
calculations and disciplines, therefore making a brute force technique effi-
cient and effective [50]. Secondly, as the overall algorithmic complexity is
not high, especially from a mathematical standpoint, the comparative sim-
plicity of the brute force technique will be ideally suited to this development
style [51]. The second algorithmic technique will be divide and conquer due
to the range of components and the number of sub-algorithms being used
that will calculate specific factors and these will make up the overall main
algorithm [52]. This combination, theoretically, negates some of the main
disadvantages associated with the other algorithmic development types, for
example, brute force does not use shortcuts and can be quite inefficient,
while divide and conquer’s primary advantage is the efficiency it brings to
the development process, subsequently minimising brute force’s detrimental
issues [53]. While other techniques, such as the decrease and conquer and
transform and conquer, could potentially be viable, the focus on simplifying
the problem to get a simpler result is not the objective in this research [54].
There are the two main goals within this paper: firstly measure the relia-
bility as a specific system configuration, making use of biometric devices,
liveness and coercion standards; secondly allowing the optimisation of the
said system, either manually or autonomically to better suit the scenario. To
do this an algorithm has been created that can produce a single output that
denotes total system viability for different security techniques. This does
not mean improvement is something to avoid, however it is not covered in
the scope of this article. It will contain factors that will be specific to the
installation environment and will not change unless different environments
are considered i.e. different location, company, etc. The associated coercion
and liveness standards will change the overall algorithm, therefore allowing
different combinations of techniques to be tested and this will help identify
suitable multi-layer fusion which will, in turn, denote the statistical security
level within the installation. However, in the future adding other algorithmic
techniques to improve performance and efficiency is something that would be
considered.
By adding new security systems, component, etc. into a system, there is
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the requirement that it solves a particular problem, and its successes depend
on the development of either a reliability value or a comparative optimisa-
tion metric [54]. Therefore, within this scenario, there is an inbuilt testing
metric which, if satisfied, indicates a success. Therefore the success of this
technique involves the development of a usable security level that is scalable
and flexible allowing developers to make informed choices for a better opti-
misation security application. This algorithm will take liveness and coercion
techniques, alongside a variety of other metrics, and calculate the overall se-
curity rating an installation has. At first this metric is abstract, however, it
can be used to compare different installation setups, when different scenar-
ios and combinations of techniques have been run through the framework.
This is useful as biometric security systems can have dramatically different
requirements going from scenario to scenario. The metrics can change due to
a variety of factors such as workforce composition to device usage. Therefore
having a straight forward tool that can be easily changed and expanded on,
with a variety of metrics and flexibility, can make the development of system
securities much more simple.
When considering the different metrics and techniques of application, the
initial algorithm was overly complex as seen within Equation 1, therefore the
first factor to consider is to eliminate errors and to make sure the algorithm
was as efficient and effective as possible.
Table 1 highlights the main components of the final algorithm as shown
in Equation: 13. These factors have been gathered due to their importance
within a security system combined with the unique factors central to this
research, such as the coercion techniques, and the device redundancies.
n∑
i=0







As shown in Table: 1, As denotes the final score; T denotes execution
time; P denotes participants; Ab denotes anomalous users; Dr denotes device
redundancy; Lt and Lc denote liveness and coercion techniques respectively.
Each of these metrics requires its own calculation and development, how-
ever, due to the complexity of some areas further calculations were needed.
For example initially, the intent was to measure when a user logged into a
system. However, this did not take into account the potential for multiple au-
thentication attempts that a single user could conduct, therefore some form
of differentiation regarding this scale was needed. To better facilitate this, as
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Component Notation Considerations
Autonomic Score As Overall value - Higher = More secure
Time T Time taken to authenticate.
Participants P Amount of users
Anomalous User-base Ab Permanence and collectability of samples
Device Redundancy Dr Combined level of Liveness/Coercion Techniques
Table 1: Final Algorithm Components.
well as to minimise the complexity of the other metrics, the algorithm was
split up, following the divide and conquer concept creating a number of sub-
calculations that provided the final algorithm with only the required data,
and reducing complexity by removing superfluous information. The next sec-
tion will highlight the different components within the sub-calculations and
how they make up the main algorithm.
3.1. Algorithm Components
This algorithm will have a variety of applications including scenario sim-
ulations identifying best-fit liveness and coercion standards; as well as iden-
tifying most suitable fusion locations and so on. When used in this way the
fusion identification tool would improve biometric security development as
it would allow a more thoroughly tested system without the same degree of
expense. Another potential route would be by using the algorithm within an
automated system as the values generated by the algorithm could be used to
adapt autonomically, creating context-aware security techniques that could
dynamically change the security provision ad-hoc. However, to begin time
will be considered and will have the notation T .
3.1.1. Time
Time has been used because it is a good way to help highlight the accuracy
of a system, and is necessary to provide much-needed context to the other
components. For example, if the algorithm output is based on one day only,
then there may be events specific to that day that cause intra-variations, or
when the measurement time period is a longer or shorter value. Subsequently,
the time value is mutable and can differ depending on the level of security
and the expected outcomes. Small scale time periods may be fine for initial
tests between 5-10 hours etc. However if the time value is desired to be
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longer, greater than 24 hours for example, then other factors must also be
considered such a noise, user-base size, etc. As most security systems are in
place for longer than one day that it is a reasonable assumption that there
are a plethora of other components to consider.
The purpose of time within the algorithm is to create a snapshot over
a specific period, the longer the time T , the more potential security threats
and problems may occur. Therefore within this algorithm, time will indicate
the time of execution.
Whilst this version of time could be viable; a variation that became appar-
ent was based around usage as well as time, what if users logged on multiple
times in a day. This may be more suitable within scenarios where users log
on and off multiple times a day, such as teaching in different classrooms and
so on. These constant authentication attempts can pose security threats,
and make the system more vulnerable to spoof attack for a number of rea-
sons. Firstly, the more attempts to authenticate means more chances for a
nefarious attacker to get into the system. Secondly, the more authentication
attempts the more chance of an administrative attack to occur. To highlight
this user traffic concept, instead of accessing time only, the algorithm would
make use of an average authentication request over a set period of time. For
example user ’x’ has logged in once in this 24 hour period, however, user ’y’
has logged in 10 times over the same 24 hour period, therefore, increasing
interactions by 900%. One additional consideration with this measurement
is that the more times a user is logging into the system the more normal it
becomes, and then if the system, autonomically or manually, is looking for
suspicious login behaviour, it will be harder to highlight.
Within the algorithm time is denoted by the value T , which equals time
taken during authentication, therefore, the more authentication attempts
that occur, the higher the time value will become. To generate this value the
authentication attempts are combined with the time taken. Therefore, the
greater amount of authentication will present a higher value and, therefore,
more options for security breaches to occur. These values were divided by the
Tn component, with n being the number of departments/samples within the
calculation (this would depend completely on the scenario), therefore always
keeping the value to a manageable number. An example of this is shown
in Equation 3; where ai equals number of people within department with a
sequence - 16, 25, 10, 40; li equals logins per department with a sequence
- 5, 30, 15, 80; k equals constant value less than or equal to one; tn equals






























This value allows the inclusion of both time taken to authenticate and
a number of times authentication occurs. Obviously, the higher either of
these values, the more chance a security threat can occur. This is due to the
correlation between the number of authentication attempts and increased
potential of attacks. The same can be said that the longer a system is in use
the more security threats will occur.
Figure 4: Time elapsed (hours) vs Security
Figure 4 shows the relationship between time elapsed and As, the auto-
nomic security level of the technique combination and gathered from process-
ing the algorithm, and it can be seen that there is a sequential degradation in
security performance as the time progresses, however, there is a large jump
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towards the end of the 12-hour segment. To identify this anomaly, the data
has been analysed and a problem regarding the user login and attempts data,
specifically that there are fewer logins on certain days when compared to the
number of people who can log in. This is interesting as there are some po-
tential ramifications here: firstly, and most benignly, are the full complement
of users not utilising the system. This could be due to some factors such as
staff illness, holiday, and lack of need, etc. and while this does impact the
system overall it does not represent a threat innately. This adds to the threat
vector research highlighted by [55] [56] [28]. It presents a potential threat
vector: if the normal login quantity is not being reached then the addition of
a nefarious user will be harder to detect. The second factor could be due to a
security breach within the system that is preventing legitimate users access,
concepts such as poisoned cache attack, comprised password databases, etc.
would prevent system use becoming a denial of service based problem. The
third option is that there is a legitimate fault with the system, or there is an
administration based attack [15].
As figure 5 shows, the Dr is very resistant to T changes, however, changes
in the liveness or coercion provision produce bigger changes as can be seen.
Techniques that have a low permeance level, and therefore do not have the
flexibility when gathering samples, will negatively impact the overall score,
as ideally, a sample would be very resistant to mutability. This is not always
practical, as this example highlights: a user that normally has no issues
using a palm print scanner, however, due to an accident they have their arm
in a cast and subsequently cannot provide the required sample [17]. If the
technique instead was fingerprint based then due to the high permanence
and collectability the system would still be able to access a sample unless the
entire hand is no longer available. This outlier will always be present, but this
algorithm will endeavour to minimise the impact of them. Therefore when
fusion occurs with two or more techniques the better they work together and
the overall higher level of Dr meaning it is more resilient to deviations, make
the overall system more secure and reliable.
To gather the data for this testing process a University in the Northwest of
the UK is being used as a case study. All of the information is being gathered
from their website and other public data repositories, for ease of replication.
For this work, universities are being considered as the main focus of data.
This is simply due to the ease of data collection, however, more information
would be advantageous in the future to denote specific user requirements.
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Figure 5: Security level over time
3.1.2. User-base
The user base is the area most prone to deviations, as the range of medi-
cal/behavioural/noise characteristics can dramatically change depending on
location, and organisation. This component identifies the number of users
being parsed throughout the system during a specific period. This metric
can change dramatically depending on date and time, for example: when
considering frequency and number of logins per day as well as the user base,
an initial assumption would be that the more users within a system then,
the more logins will occur. While this is a reasonable assumption, other sit-
uations can impact this dramatically. For example, it would be reasonable
to expect ten users to have fewer authentication attempts than 20 users.
However, if the ten users are power users, and log on 30 times each within a
particular session equalling 300 authentication attempts and the 20 users log
on ten times each equalling 200 authentication attempts, it shows that the
values alone do not show all of the potentials. This highlights the importance
of user location and composition when considering what to expect from the
user-base. Therefore, the purpose of this user-base metric is to identify the
styles of access attempts, when will these access attempts occur, and what
specific variations are within the user base. A broad generalisation will be
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identified for the user base assuming that everyone can access and use the
security techniques.
Subsequently, both the number of users and the usage per user must
be considered as both will have an impact on the system. Firstly the user
amount will be discussed.
3.1.3. User Amount
The first thing that is identified is the number of potential users within
an installation. For the purpose of this example, a university is used: and
within this example, there are three categories of measurement each repre-
senting a different organisational group within the university; a department,
a school(which comprises of one to three departments) and a faculty compris-
ing of ’n’ schools and departments. As there can be a variety of values within
each area, the mean of users will be found which will enable a more regu-
lated calculation to be developed. The mean is being used as it is almost
impossible to predict, without additional tools, how many authentications
attempts there will be on a system at any one period. This minimises the
impact of negative user involvement such as time periods that normal user
authentication is minimised e.g. illness, holidays, meetings, etc.
To better visualise this data; Table 2 identifies a faculty level calculation
with each row denoting a school or department. Whilst Table 3 shows the
mean data assuming that ’n’ is the number of users within a department,
and An equates to the sequence of users:








Table 2: Mean Data
This would then be used to create the sum of users within the simulation




Table 3: Data Sequence
n∑
i=1
An = a1 + a2 + a3 + a4 + a5 + a6 + a7
n∑
i=1
An = 16 + 25 + 10 + 40 + 55 + 10 + 18 = 174 (3)
It may seem unnecessary to include the sigma summation for this sim-
ple equation. However, this example has limited data complexity. If im-
plemented in a large enough organisation the amount of data may become
extremely large and, therefore, would become more difficult to manipulate,
hence the future proofing technique. The final stage would be to calculate
the final mean as shown by Equation 4:
n∑
i=1





Within this data, the mean value for users is 25 this can then be used to
show how many users are authenticating within the system and is the first
stage of creating valuable data that can be used within the overall algorithm;
as shown in Table 4.
One technique that this metric lends itself to is the application of auto-
nomic data collection and context awareness [57] [58]. The inclusion of this
logins per organisation structure would allow the autonomic environment
access to important data regarding user log on trends. This would further
allow self-optimisation techniques that improve resource allocation to certain
environments or changing security techniques completely.
To further evaluate the data additional factors would be needed to be
considered such as the mean and absolute deviation. If Table 4 is used as
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Table 4: Mean Variation




x− θ = 9 + 0 + 15 + 15 + 25 + 15 + 7 = 86 (5)
This can then be used to find out the mean divergence, therefore allowing
the algorithm to check if a department is varying too much from the mean,







9 + 0 + 15 + 15 + 25 + 15 + 7
7
= 12.28 = 12 (6)
While this data is useful from the algorithmic standpoint, simply under-
standing the number of users is not sufficient, as it is unlikely that users will
only log in once a day, indeed depending what environment is being worked
within, the logins may contain huge divergence intra-departmentally. This
is due to the amount of workforce that have a permeance altering factor
associated with their account. Therefore, the next stage of this metric’s de-
velopment would be to identify the number of logins per period; this could
then be combined with some users to produce a valuable metric which will
identify the number of average attempts to authenticate over each period.
To do this: the average number of attempts will be gathered, this in-
formation can be used within either the time or the user component of the
algorithm. Equation 7 follows the same equation process as Table 3 and
Equation 3. Firstly users need to be identified, secondly average attempts to
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login/authenticate within a period e.g. hours, days, months, etc. need to be





























Now that both of the means have been calculated the next stage is to










= 61/25 = 2.4 (9)
After these means have been gathered and the product of both is cal-
culated and the average authentication attempts for the particular period
will be highlighted, in this case, one day for a university faculty as shown in
Equation 9. The main problem here is that the time data is static and the
user data is only based on a single area. To make this more useful for the
full algorithm, more output is needed, potentially including multiple times
values/multiple faculties and so on. Currently, all that can be gathered from
the data is how many average attempts a period there are. This then needs
to be combined with other aspects within the overall algorithm for context
e.g. liveness detection false acceptance rate (FAR) of 0.01 means that if this
number is too great, it will cause authentication problem as users that should
not be able to access the system will be able to do so [17].
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Currently, the time and user-base have been identified, whilst the users/
participants have been considered it is imperative that they are focused on.
The subsequent sections will look into this
3.1.4. Participants
After T has been calculated P must be found, and the following equation
finds out the value of P , which is participants, which in turn denotes the
user data for testing using the ranges identified within Table 5.
Participants Calculation
ai = number of people within department.
li = logins per department.
k = constant value less than or equal to one.
Table 5: Participants Calculation
To begin, P will always require to be a positive number, otherwise it
will cause the security value to drop unnecessarily, and whilst this might be
useful in the future it is not viable now. Then ai and li and used to gather the
summation value, which indicates the total amount of logins in a period of
time, finally the constant is included to keep the positive value as mentioned
above, this is seen in Equation 10.







+ k ≤ 1

















+ 1 ≤ 1
P = 1045.25
ai = 16, 25, 10, 40
li = 5, 30, 15, 80
(10)
The reason for this distinction is that while a user may log in only once
a day within department X, department Y may face a huge amount of lo-
gins due to different classrooms, installations, subjects, etc. The summation
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calculates this value and makes sure that it is greater than zero. This allows
the final value to be included in the overall algorithm. Now that both time
and user base have been identified the next area to consider is the inclusion
of both liveness and coercion detection techniques.
3.1.5. Liveness Detection and Coercion Detection
Current research highlights methods of biometric metrics, and, for the
purpose of these papers, the metrics discussed in [17] and [9] will be used
with the addition of an interval measurement system proposed in [6]. This
will allow a method of measuring the effect implementing both liveness and
coercion techniques into a system, with more meaningful data that can be
compared and evaluated more accurately than the ordinal techniques used
in the past. Subsequently, the results can be used to highlight if a technique
is better or worse for a given scenario, with higher output denoting more
secure techniques. This will also allow for the inclusion of additional features
such as the specific scenario factors e.g. an installation might need high
security but has very little space for additional hardware [59]. Therefore, a
software/intrinsic solution, while not as robust from a security view, may be
a better option. By making this algorithm as adaptable as possible allows a
more personalised security application process, and the use of these metrics
makes the application within autonomic environments easier to develop.
Biometric devices can be defined by a variety of these salient charac-
teristics and a plethora of considerations must be taken into account when
deciding on suitable procedures for a system. Normally the choice of such
techniques includes factors such as device location, liveness technique, etc.
Therefore, the liveness and coercion techniques will be measured against
the following factors: universality, permanence, collectability, performance,
acceptability and circumvention [17]. These have been populated using a
selection of liveness standards as shown in Table: 6 and then Table 7, the
data has been gathered from four techniques, two liveness [60] [61] and two
coercion standards[6].
These metrics were gathered by assigning values to different liveness and
coercion techniques as shown in [6]. This took into account factors such
as hardware, software requirements, ease of sample collection and so on.
Currently, this is somewhat dependent on the interpretation of the developer,
but once again as more usage occurs the easier it will be to compare values.
The purpose of this component is to identify the different biometric de-
vices and techniques that work best together; which can be based on multi-
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Liveness - Facial Modality 1.67 4.00 4.00 5.47 1.00 3.12 3.2
Liveness - ECG based biometric identification 2.33 1.33 5.00 2.13 1.00 1.62 2.2
Coercion - Skin Conductivity 2.00 1.00 4.00 1.80 1.00 1.45 1.9
Coercion - Facial Micro-Movements 1.67 1.00 1.67 1.53 1.00 1.63 1.4
Liveness Technique Coercion Technique
1.47222 2.888889
2.18055 1.548611
Table 7: Algorithm Scenario Values
layer fusion and in this situation specifically detailing liveness and coercion.
This component will have some sub-calculations that will provide the final
device redundancy value for use in the main algorithm.
3.1.6. Device Redundancy
The device redundancy (Dr) is the metric that utilises this liveness and
coercion data. This provides a level of security with lower values denoting a
secure system while higher values denoting less secure. These base values are
shown in Table 9 and calculated using the equation shown in Equation 12.
It is possible for this value to be 0 which would mean that there are no
liveness or coercion techniques included. If this occurs then, the values being
zero will have an overall negative effect throughout the algorithm. Therefore
to prevent this problem occurring, a constant has been used to add to the















+ e1 = 6.298
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(11)
Within Equation 11 the Dr is found, this is done by taking the values
highlighted in Table 7 which equate to ld for the liveness detection and cd
for the coercion detection. This is because the choice of techniques will have
the greatest impact on whether a user can access the technology, i.e. a user
with no hands is unable to use fingerprint-based techniques and so on. There
is also a constant used as if the value would equal zero then the algorithm
would fail to run. This prevents the lack of liveness and coercion standards
causing failures within the system and would represent a single liveness and
coercion technique being used. Whilst this would not provide the most se-
cure system, it is a common theme to have a unimodal approach, especially
for older installations. However, there is the potential that fusion techniques
could be encountered therefore the algorithm must be robust enough to sup-
port these factors. As well as the device redundancy the composition of the
workforce/user base must be considered. This is a much greater concern for
biometric-based security since the massive impact feature deviation can have
on the security of a system.
3.1.7. Anomalous User-base
The permanence and collectability of biometric samples are a key factor
within the biometric classification and this has a deep impact on the indi-
vidual techniques, it is also a factor that needs to be highlighted within the
overall algorithm. If a user is unable to use a biometric due to impairment,
then this must be taken into account when designing the system’s security,
otherwise ostracising a portion of the users, again highlight the potential
advantage for dynamic security and autonomous provision.
This data can be gathered by applying permanence and collectability
metrics, therefore, highlighting what could affect the techniques and routes.
Ideally, up-to-date accurate data would be used here, gathered from HR
departments within a company. However, for this simulation, the following
assumptions identified within Table 8 have been used to highlight the ratio
of impaired to non-impaired staff. This can be used as an example baseline
if the actual value is unknown.
Table 8 shows that, within the UK, there is a large percentage of the
working population who have a disability, as defined by the UK Govern-
ment, and this calculation indicates that for every one officially categorised
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Metric Percent Actual
Current Population 100% 63,000,000
<14 Years 17.60% 11,088,000
>64 Years 16.40% 10,332,000
Non-workers 34.00% 21,420,000
Potential working pop 66.00% 41,580,000
Pop with disability 16.40% 10,332,000
% disabled pop in workforce 46.00% 4,752,720
% non-disabled pop in workforce 76.00% 36,827,280
Disabled to non-disabled workforce 7.748674 8:1
Table 8: Ratio Impaired/Non-Impaired
disabled person within a particular workforce, there are eight non-disabled
members of the same workforce [62]. Therefore, this component highlights
an example value which uses the above ratio of people with impairments. If
a sample organisation of 20 is considered, then it would be expected that
two members of that workforce have an impairment. This means that there
are at least two users that might not be able to provide some of the common
biometric samples dependent on the impairments in question, especially as
mobility issues are some of the most common impairments and subsequently
techniques such as gait, facial or iris scans, etc. may encounter problems
[62]. The notation for this value is Ab and takes into account participants
within a system that will have an impairment that will cause a technique to
work either sub-optimally or not at all. This follows the 8:1 ratio shown in
Table 8 and the calculation can be seen in Equation 12. This shows that in
using the data highlighted, there will be 10.1 members of the workforce that













By taking all of these metrics into consideration; these components will
identify different stakeholder groups that can impact the security within a
system, and are catered to biometric security specifically, culminating in







The purpose of these metrics is to highlight different variables that can
affect security when focusing on liveness and coercion detection. These are
time, users, device redundancy, liveness and coercion detection. The follow-
ing section will detail these factors. These factors will produce an output
‘As’which will denote the overall level of security for the current system set-
up, allowing comparison to other installations by changing the liveness and
coercion standards used.
4. Testing and Evaluation
This paper claims that the algorithm presented will enable systems archi-
tects to understand potential fusion between the two sub-layers of proposed
biometric security after sample acquisition: liveness detection and coercion
detection. This algorithm will show how different combinations of techniques
can be used within a specified organisation, therefore creating an aimed met-
ric that can inform the most suitable choices of techniques.
The evidence to support this is seen by gathering information relating to
a variety of features and then subsequently highlight their appropriateness
within a specific installation. In this section, the algorithm will be tested
using a range of dummy data to show how the overall environment works.
In this testing scenario, the dummy company data in Table 9 will be used.
This data is based on the statistical data gathered from [63]. With the
login attempts this represents user that might log on only once, whilst others
might log on and off a number of times per day, for example due to teaching
duties in different rooms. The values at this time are random, but within
an active scenario these values would be gathered from the organisation’s IT
department and would be focused depending on the installation requirements.
For example if the installation is occurring within the School of History then
only those logins would be required and so on.
As well as the user data there also needs to be liveness and coercion
technique data, as the changing of these factors will allow different techniques
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School Departments Users Login Attempts
School of Technology 91 130
Computing Science 16 5
Engineering 25 30
Mathematics 10 15
Applied Technology 40 80
School of History 91 130
Classical Studies 32 32
China Studies 25 18
Medieval Studies 18 22
Archaeology 52 110
Table 9: Initial Company Data
to be tested before expensive implementation needs to occur. By using a
taxonomy to categorise different liveness and coercion techniques, a value
denoting the viability of said techniques can be identified and used. The
taxonomy that is used to classify the information is highlighted within [6].
Two examples for each are as shown within Table 9.
Therefore, the two schools will be tested with four techniques, the com-
binations of these liveness and coercion detection practises are as follows:
1. Facial Modality and Skin Conductivity Tests
2. Facial Modality and Facial Micro-Movements
3. ECG Techniques and Skin Conductivity Tests
4. ECG Techniques and Facial Micro-Movements
Therefore if the School of Technology is considered first then Equation 14



























This shows that within the school of technology the best techniques
would be option B - containing facial modality [60] along with facial micro-
movements. Whereas the worst combination would be facial modality [60]
with skin conductivity tests - option A. However, when using the same co-
ercion and liveness data on the second test set (school of history), the same


























Once again it shows that while the overall values have changed, this is
encountered for by the increased size of the raw data, and within this area,
the same two techniques are the best (b) and the worst (a).
These data values can change dramatically, and more or less variation can
be seen by changing the number of users within the system, the number of
logins per day per person, along with the composition of the workforce. Cur-
rently, this algorithm utilises a 1:8 ratio of an impaired workforce, however,
this value can be made much more specific with actual company information.
This alongside the data specificity is the two main problems that have been
identified within this work
During this testing and analysis of the algorithm and data, some factors
became apparent that are of significance. To further improve the algorithm
process and the applicability within the security design environment, it is
imperative that these are addressed. They are:
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1. Single Data Reliance
2. Data Specificity
3. Interface development
4.1. Single Data Reliance
The initial observation when using this algorithm is that whilst it can
correctly identify the security level of the overall system, the focus is on one
specific set of data. For example one authentication style over a period of
time. To take full advantage of this algorithm a way to apply the data gath-
ered in an autonomic way, therefore, promoting ad-hoc security. Therefore
if this comparison was adopted then the following would be seen, and they
can be compared together, as shown by Graph 6.
Figure 6: Real coercion and liveness data
Graph: 6 highlights the differences between the combinations of liveness
and coercion techniques. These are grouped as appropriate to the sample
provision, however, if completely separate techniques were being used to-
gether, to promote a more secure and robust environment for example, then
the algorithm would be able to take this into account by simply inputting the
correct values. For example, currently if focusing on fingerprint techniques
then utilising the dermalog liveness technique [64] along with intentional false
authentication coercion techniques [6] then there is an obvious connection
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between the two techniques. However, if the developers wanted a coercion
technique that was specifically different from the original sample, then they
could use facial micro-movements [6]. This could add a level of complexity to
the system, would require more hardware and infrastructure. However over-
all it could be more secure. The key to this scenario is the ability to change
the weightings of the algorithm depending on the scenario requirements. In
this situation, if the above example was going forward the architects could
reduce the impact of additional hardware within the algorithm, therefore,
allowing techniques with different hardware requirements to be viewed more
favourably, therefore, providing a dynamic and reactive technique that could
adapt to the scenario it was being applied to.
When this comparison has been achieved it becomes easier to identify
techniques that are superior to the others as they are numerically different
from each other. In this case, it is obvious that the ”best” technique is the
most secure, and the technique that had the highest coercion and lowest
liveness was the second most secure and most practical. When viewing this
data other factors need to be considered, as this is not intended to be the
only degree of information, instead, this is the top level component of the
analysis.
4.2. Data Specificity
The second factor that became apparent when dealing with the algorithm
is that there is a need for specific data and the more data it can parse the
more robust and accurate it will become. This is because the algorithm uses
real data to provide information about a technique or system over a period
of time, therefore, demanding regular injections of data, which in the current
environment is very difficult to provide. Therefore to improve the overall
system more data needs to be injected into the algorithm allowing for greater
evaluation. Coupled with this innate scalability, the practicality of including
specific data, e.g. such as the data regarding the number of users and login
attempts throughout the system, is something that is very important to
include as it provides specific information about the requirements. Within
this algorithm a rough ratio of 1:8 has been used to detect if a user has any
impairment based problems utilising biometric environment, however, the
actual data would be much more relevant to use within the overall algorithm.
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4.3. Interface development
One factor that is not directly related to the technical areas of the algo-
rithm, but has an enormous influence on the usefulness, is the lack of a user
interface. The current algorithm is quite complicated to calculate however
with the integration of a valid interface the algorithmic output could become
much easier to work with and relevant to different users. This interface would
enable researchers and developers to enter their data into easy to use forms
which would convert the data, using the algorithm into meaningful outputs,
including graphs etc. This is something that would be advantageous to the
overall system, whilst not being urgent, therefore it would be suitable for
future work to identify.
The factors have shown that while the overall modus of the algorithm
works, several areas need improvement. Specifically, the use of accurate
data regarding the logins per day; however, this is something that is only
practically available when there is a specific organisation that is willing to
provide this information. Which is why it was simulated in this paper. The
next and most vital aspect to consider is the application of more data within
the algorithm, allowing a much higher degree of confidence. This is something
that is being considered in future work.
5. Conclusion
This paper has highlighted the construction and development of an algo-
rithm that will be used to develop a comparable standardised value that can
be applied to biometric system design and development — enabling system
architects to optimise or compare system components and fusion technique.
By allowing an easier to implement, and accurate, comparison of system ca-
pabilities the process of security development can be streamlined and will
become scalable to future techniques and threat errors. To validate this hy-
pothesis data from a UK university was used in the testing process, regardless
the technique is applicable in any workforce and organisation. By using this
model, architects can develop robust systems more easily, especially when
including different security components such as liveness and coercion detec-
tion techniques. Currently, the main focus of these results has been from a
developer standpoint, allowing optimisation and general reliability testing.
However, a secondary area that this could make use of this technique would
be autonomous system development. The value provided by this algorithm
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could be used to denote an individual’s personalised security process. There-
fore by changing the device/liveness/coercion techniques to better suit the
individual depending on noise factors, or performance impact. For exam-
ple: minimise the use of iris scanners if there are a large proportion of users
with that specific disability such as Anophthalmia. This application of self-
optimisation and context awareness would allow personalised security to be
developed.
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